ι Classical modal logic provides no interesting answer to this question because it lets antinomies turn all wellformed formulas (including all modal formulas) into theorems. In the present note we propose two nonclassical modal systems which do not suffer from this defect. Both systems are obtained by supplementing the semantics of Asenjo's and Tamburino's antinomic propositional logic L (see [1] , familiarity with which will be assumed in this article) with a very natural-sounding truth condition for modal formulas. The surprising result is that antinomies are in any case both necessary and impossible: according to the second system we propose, they are both non-necessary and possible as well. It may be doubted whether these results are in accord with our intuitions. However, it should be remembered that our intuitions were formed during centuries of classical slumber; acquiring the right intuitions in antinomic thinking may simply be a matter of time.
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1 The systems
Language
The language is as in [1] , p. 19, but add to formation rule 2: if (fti is a statement form, Πβ$ι is a statement form. Definitions:
Semantics
An antinomic model is a triple {W,R, F>, where Wis a set (of "possible worlds"), R Q W X W, and V: AT x W-+ (0,1,2). (Here AT is the set of atomic statements.) V(A i9 w) = 0 or 1, whereas V(B i9 w) = 2.
The interpretation function / is defined as follows:
I(A h w) = V(A h w), I(B h w) = V(B i9 w).
2. /(-i(Bi, w), /((Bj $ (&2> w)> where $ is a truth-functional connective: as given in the tables in [1] , p. 18, suitably relativized to the world w.
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The motivation for the latter clause is straightforward. Like [1], we read "/((Bj, w) = 0(1,2)" as "(B! is true and not false (false and not true, true and false) at w". Hence clause 3 is merely another way of stating the familiar and intuitively plausible condition 3':
We say that <Ά X is valid in <^,/?, F> iff for all w E ^/((B^ w) Φ 1 (i.e., iff (Bi is true at all w E W in the model).
A serial antinomic model is an antinomic model satisfying the condition that Vwlw'wRw'. 
Soundness and completeness

Theorem (& x is valid in the class of all antinomic models (all serial antinomic models) iff (B 2 is derivable in M (MD).
Proof: From right to left: trivial.
From left to right: we define the canonical model (W,R, V) for M (MD) as follows: 
